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ABSTRACT
We study the secrecy capacity of the frequency-selective
wiretap channel. Assuming that a guard interval of L sym-
bols is inserted to avoid the inter-block interference and
these symbols are discarded at the receiver, the single-carrier
frequency-selective channel is modeled as a multiple-input
multiple-output Toeplitz matrix. For this special case of the
MIMO wiretap channel and under the assumption of per-
fect channel knowledge at transmitter (CSIT), we propose
a practical Vandermonde precoding scheme that transmits
the confidential messages on the zeros of the eavesdrop-
per channel. It is proved that this Vandermonde precoding
achieves the full multiplexing gain offered by the frequency-
selective wiretap channel in the high SNR regime. For a
more realistic case where the transmitter only knows the le-
gitime channel we consider the “mask beamforming” scheme
where the artificial noise is sent on the zeros of the legitime
channel via the Vandermonde precoding. This mask beam-
forming is shown to achieve the same multiplexing gain as
the perfect CSIT.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider the frequency-selective wiretap channel where
the legitime transmitter sends confidential messages to the
intended receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. Al-
though recent works have characterized the secrecy capac-
ity of the wiretap fading channel for the scalar case [1], the
Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) case [2], and Multi-
ple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) case [3], these works
only apply to the frequency flat fading channel. To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, none has explicitly consid-
ered the case of the frequency selective channel relevant to
current standards (such as IEEE802.11a type). In order to
model the frequency selective channel with L paths, we as-
sume that a guard interval of L symbols is inserted at the
beginning of each block of N symbols in order to avoid
the inter-block interference. By further assuming that each
receiver observes N symbols out of N + L by discard-
ing L symbols, the block frequency selective channel can
be modeled as a N + L multiple-input N multiple-output
Toeplitz matrix1. On one hand, it is known that the parallel
wiretap fading channels achieve the secrecy capacity which
does not scale with the SNR [1]. On other hand, Khisti et
al. showed that the capacity of the MIMO wiretap chan-
nel grows linearly, i.e. r log SNR where r denotes the ef-
fective degree of freedom (to be specified) [3]. It clearly
appears that performing OFDM transmission to convert the
frequency-selective channel into a set of N parallel flat fad-
ing channels is highly suboptimal in terms of multiplexing
gain. Moreover to achieve the secrecy capacity of MISO
andMIMOwiretap channel in the high SNR regime, the op-
timal strategy consists of beamforming in the null space of
the eavesdropper’s channel [2, 3]. Inspired by this strategy,
in the case of perfect CSIT, we propose a practical Vander-
monde precoding scheme that nulls the eavesdropper chan-
nel in single-carrier frequency selective channels. Since the
channel of the legitimate and eavesdropper are statistically
independent, this scheme provide L (where L is the num-
ber of paths) degrees of freedom to transmit secret informa-
tion. Note that Vandermonde matrices have already been
considered for cognitive radios [4] and CDMA systems [5]
to reduce/null interference. One of the appealing aspects
of Vandermonde precoding is that it does not require a spe-
cific secrecy encoding technique but can be applied to any
classical encoding schemes. In a more practical case where
the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper’ channel,
we consider the mask beamforming scheme with Vander-
monde precoding. The idea here is to send artificial noise
on the zeros of the legitimate channel in such a way that L
degrees of freedom of the eavesdropper are jammed. Inter-
estingly, in the high SNR regime, L degrees of freedom for
the secrecy capacity can be achieved as for the perfect CSIT
case.
In the following, section 2 presents the frequency selec-
tive wire-tap channel model. Section 3 introduces the Van-
dermonde precoding both for the perfect and partial CSIT
1The last assumption implies in practice that both the intended receiver
and the eavesdropper have the same receiver structure, i.e. the eavesdrop-
per is not allowed/capable to modify its receiver.
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Fig. 1. Wiretap model
cases. The behavior in the high SNR regime is also dis-
cussed. Finally, section 4 compares the performance for the
various cases.
2. MODEL
2.1. Channel Model
We consider the block frequency-selective fading channel
given by
yt = T (h)xt + nt (1)
zt = T (g)xt + νt, t = 1, . . . , T
where T (h), T (g) denotes a N × (N + L) Toeplitz ma-
trix with L + 1 i.i.d. Gaussian distributed paths h,g ∼
NC(0, IL+1) corresponding to the legitime, eavesdropper
channel
T (h) =
2
66664
hL · · · h0 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 hL · · · h0
3
77775
xt ∈ C
N+L
denotes the transmit vector at channel use t,
and finally nt,νt ∼ NC(0, IN ) are independent AWGN.
The input matrix is subject to the power constraint given by
1
T
T∑
t=1
xHt xt ≤ (N + L)P (2)
We assume that the channels remain constant over a block
length of T channel uses for an arbitrary large T . At each
channel use t, we transmit N + L symbols by appending a
guard interval of size L larger than the coherence time. This
enables to avoid the interference between neighbor channel
uses. We assume first that the channels h,g are known by
all terminals. Then we consider the case where the trans-
mitter knows only the legitime channel hwhile the intended
receiver and the eavesdropper know both channels.
2.2. Secrecy capacity
The wiretap channel was first introduced by Wyner [6] in
the scalar case of degraded channels. The secrecy rate is
said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (T, 2TR)
codes for w uniformly distributed in [1, 2, . . . , 2TR] such
that the error probability at the intended receiver vanishes
and the equivocation rate 1T H(w|z) approaches
1
T H(w).
Moreover, the secrecy capacity, the supremum of the se-
crecy rates, of the block frequency selective channel (1) in
bps per dimension is given by [7]
C =
1
N + L
max
pu,px|u
I(u;y)− I(u; z) (3)
for some auxiliary random variable u satisfying the Markov
chain u → x → (y, z).
2.3. Equivalent MIMO block fading
The frequency-selective wiretap channel (1) is a special case
of the MIMO flat-fading wiretap channel with N +L trans-
mit antennas,N receive antennas at the eavesdropper,N an-
tenna at the legitime receiver. It has been proved in [8][9][10]
that the MIMO secrecy capacity channel per transmit an-
tenna is given by
max
S:tr(S)≤(N+L)P
1
N + L
(log |I+HSHH |−log |I+GSGH |)
(4)
where xt ∼ NC(0,S). Interestingly, the structure of
the optimal solution is such as no information is transmit-
ted along any direction where the eavesdropper observes a
stronger signal than the intended receiver. In the high SNR
regime (where all channels become comparable), the opti-
mal solution imposes to send specifically on the null sub-
space of the eavesdropper channel [3]. The secrecy degree
of freedom (pre-log of (4)) is given by the rank of HG⊥
whereG⊥ denotes the projection matrix onto the null space
of G. Unlike previous works, we focus in the next sections
on the specific structure (Toeplitz) of the MIMO channel
and provide a practical precoding that achieves in the high
SNR regime the degrees of freedom of the MIMO secrecy
capacity.
3. VANDERMONDE PRECODING
3.1. Perfect CSIT
First we consider the case where the transmitter knows per-
fectly both the legitime and eavesdropper channels. In or-
der to achieve the linear scaling of the secrecy capacity, we
design the precoder such that the transmitter sends in the or-
thogonal space of the eavesdropper’s channel by satisfying
T (g)xt = 0N , ∀t (5)
This condition is always satisfied by forming xt such that
xt = Vgut (6)
where ut ∈ C
L
is the symbol vector with covarianceΦ,Vg
is a (N + L)× L Vandermonde matrix given by
Vg =


1 · · · 1
a1 · · · aL
a21 · · · a
2
L
...
. . .
...
aN+L−11 · · · a
N+L−1
L

 (7)
where {al, . . . , aL} are the roots of the polynomial S(z) =∑L
i=0 giz
L−i with L + 1 coefficients of the eavesdropper’s
channel g. For later use we let vg,i denote the i-th col-
umn of Vg . It follows immediately that the Vandermonde
precoding is one deterministic way of mapping the random
symbol vector u to the transmit vector x in (3). The power
constraint is replaced by
tr(VgΦV
H
g ) ≤ P (8)
The orthogonality between the Vandermonde matrix and the
eavesdropper’s channel yields
I(u; z) = log |I + T (g)VgΦV
H
g T (g)
H | = 0 (9)
as if the eavesdropper channel did not exist. The secrecy
capacity of the frequency selective channel (1) with Van-
dermonde precoding reduces to
Cv =
1
N + L
max
tr(VgΦVHg )≤(N+L)P
log |I + HΦHH | (10)
where we defined H = T (h)Vg ∈ C
N×L
. Although the
above secrecy capacity concave in Φ can be optimized ex-
plicitly, here we restrict ourselves to a diagonal input co-
variance. This is sufficient to achieve the multiplexing gain
offered by the channel, as we will see below. In particu-
lar, we consider the power allocation Φ = diag(p1, . . . , pL)
that equalizes
piαi =
(N + L)P
L
, i = 1, . . . , L (11)
where we let αi = ||vg,i||
2.
Lemma 1 The secrecy capacity of Vandermonde pre-
coding with the equalized power allocation (11) achieves
the multiplexing gain of LN+L .
Sketch of the proof The achievable secrecy capacity
with Vandermonde precoding with the power allocation (11)
is given by
Cv(P )
(a)
=
1
N + L
log
˛˛˛
˛IN + (N + L)PL HDHH
˛˛˛
˛
(b)
=
1
N + L
log
˛˛˛
˛IL + (N + L)PL T (h)V˜gV˜Hg T (h)H
˛˛˛
˛
=
1
N + L
log
˛˛˛
˛IL + (N + L)PL T (h)T (h)HV˜Hg V˜g
˛˛˛
˛
(c)
=
L
N + L
log P + O(1)
where in (a) we define D = diag
(
1
α1
, . . . , 1αL
)
, (b) fol-
lows by letting V˜g = VgD
1/2, a scaled Vandermonde ma-
trix whose columns are all unit-norm, (c) follows from
rank(T (h)T (h)HVHg Vg) = rank(V
H
g Vg) = L
by noticing that T (h)T (h)H is invertible (since all the columns
of the Vandermonde matrix are linearly independent2). The
last expression shows that the secrecy capacity with the Van-
dermonde precoding achieves LN+L degrees of freedom. ¤
In order to enhance the performance, we can replace the
equalized power allocation (11) by the following waterfill-
ing power allocation. Apply singular value decomposition
so that
H = UhΛhP
H
h
where Uh ∈ C
N×N
,Ph ∈ C
L×L
are unitary matrices and
Λh ∈ C
N×L
contains r singular values {λ
1/2
hi }. Then, the
i-th diagonal element is given by
pi =
[
µ
αi
−
1
λhi
]
+
(12)
where µ is determined so as to satisfy the total power con-
straint
∑r
i=1 αipi = (N + L)P . It is not difficult to see
that if α1λh1 = · · · =
αL
λhL
the waterfilling power allocation
coincides with the equalized allocation (11).
3.2. Partial CSIT
We now consider a more realistic scenario where the trans-
mitter only knows the legitimate channel h. We apply the
mask beamforming scheme originally proposed by [11] and
analyzed in [3]. Let us form the transmit vector x ∈ CN+L
such as
x = [V˜h|Q]
[
η
u
]
(13)
where Vh ∈ C
(N+L)×L
is the normalized Vandermonde
matrix that nulls the roots of h with unit-norm columns,
Q ∈ C(N+L)×N is unitary matrix obtained by the compact
singular value decomposition of T (h) = U′ΛQH such that
QHQ = I, η ∼ NC(0, P IL) is noise, u ∼ NC(0, P IN ) is
the symbol vector. Notice that the precoding matrix V˜h for
the artificial noise can be replaced by any matrix that is or-
thogonal to T (h), for example by a unitary matrix orthogo-
nal toQ as considered in [3]. The received signals are given
by
y = T (h)Qu + n (14)
z = T (g)Qu + T (g)V˜hη + ν (15)
2rank(AB) = rank(B) if A is invertible
The secrecy capacity achieved by the mask beamforming is
given by
Cmb(P ) =
1
N + L
“
log |IN + PT (h)T (h)
H | − Cresidualmb (P )
”
(16)
where Cresidualmb (P ) is given by
C
residual
mb (P ) = log
|Σ(P ) + PT (g)QQHT (g)H |
|Σ(P )|
= log |IN + PΣ
−1(P )T (g)QQHT (g)H |
and we define the covariance of the overall noise seen by
the eavesdropper
Σ(P ) = IN + PT (g)V˜hV˜
H
h T (g)
H .
Lemma 2 The secrecy capacity of the mask beamform-
ing achieves the multiplexing gain LN+L .
Sketch of the proof We show that the first term in (16)
scales as N log(P ) in the high SNR regime. This can be
easily seen by noticing that T (h) has a rank N , i.e.
log |IN + PT (h)T (h)
H | =
N∑
i=1
log(1 + Pλhi ) (17)
where λhi are the N non-zero eigenvalues of T (h)T (h)
H .
Next, we consider the scaling of Cresidualmb (P ) as P → ∞.
Let T (g)V˜hV˜
H
h T (g)
H = UΛvUH where Λv contains L
eigen values of {λvl }. In this case,
C
residual
mb (P ) = log |I + PΣ(P )
−1T (g)QQHT (g)H |
= log |I + Dv(P )T (g)QQHT (g)H | (18)
with Dv(P ) = diag([P, ...P, P1+Pλv
1
, ..., P1+Pλv
L
]). In the
high SNR regime, the term (18) scales as (N − L) log(P )
whereas (17) scales as N log(P ). The secrecy capacity of
the make beamforming scales therefore as LN+L log(P ), the
same as the perfect CSI case. ¤
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy capacity of the pro-
posed Vandermonde precoding as well as the mask beam-
forming.
For the sake of comparison, we first consider the spe-
cial case of the MISO wiretap channel where the intended
receiver receives a scalar observation while the eavesdrop-
per has N observations. We average the capacity over a
large number of randomly generated channels with N = 64
and L = 16. In Fig. 2, we compare the secrecy capacity
with the Vandermonde precoding, the mask beamforming,
and the optimal beamforming strategy [8] as a function of
P . We observe that all strategies achieve the same multi-
plexing gain of 1N+L . In fact, the MISO secrecy capacity is
given by
1
N + L
log
(
1 + (N + L)P max
φ:T (g)φ=0
|hH1 φ|
2
)
(19)
where hH1 denotes the first row of T (h), while the Vander-
monde precoding achieves
1
N + L
log(1 + (N + L)P max
l
|hH1 vg,l|
2). (20)
Clearly, there exists a constant gap between (19) and (20)
due to the suboptimal choice of beamforming vector. With
the mask beamforming that sends one symbol andN+L−1
artificial noise under the MISO setting, it is not difficult to
see that (N + L)Cmb(P ) in the high SNR regime reduces
to„
log(1 + ||h1||
2
P ) − log
˛˛˛
˛I + 1||h1||2 Λ
−1T (g)h1h
H
1 T (g)
H
˛˛˛
˛
«
where Λ is a diagonal matrix related to the N eigenvalues
of T (g)Q′Q′HT (g) whereQ′ is the unitary matrix orthog-
onal to h1.
Next, we consider the MIMOwiretap channel where the
transmitter sends N + L signals and both the intended re-
ceiver and the eavesdropper receive N observations. We
compare the secrecy capacity of Vandermonde precoding
(10) and that of the mask beamforming (16). For the Van-
dermonde precoding we consider both the equalized power
(11) and the waterfilling power (12). Figs. 3, 4 show the se-
crecy capacity in bps/dimension achieved by these schemes
for N = L = 64, N = 64, L = 16 respectively. The latter
parameter is inspired by the 802.11a where we aim at send-
ing the confidential messages over a cyclic prefix. It can
be remarked that both the Vandermonde precoding and the
mask beamforming achieve the same slope in the high SNR
regime. The mask beamforming performs closed to the Van-
dermonde precoding with equal power allocation especially
for N = L. We observe also a non-negligible gain due to
the watefilling power allocation for the Vandermonde pre-
coding. The relative merit between these schemes is out of
scope of this paper and remains as a future investigation.
These numerical examples show that the Vandermonde
precoding as well as the mask beamforming are able to ex-
ploit the full degrees of freedom offered by the frequency-
selective wiretap channel. The Vandermonde precoding with
waterfilling power allocation yields a substantial gain with
respect to the mask beamforming at the price of perfect
channel knowledge at the transmitter.
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